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This Article examines the unprecedented and deeply underestimated global power that the EU is exercising through its legal institutions and standards, and how it successfully exports that inﬂuence to the rest
of the world. Introducing the notion of “the Brussels Effect,” the Article shows how market forces alone
are sufﬁcient to convert EU standards into global standards. Without the need to use international institutions or seek other nations’ cooperation, the EU has a strong and growing ability to promulgate regulations
that become entrenched in the legal frameworks of developed and developing markets alike, leading to
a notable “Europeanization” of many important aspects of global commerce. This Article identiﬁes and
explains the precise conditions for and the speciﬁc mechanism through which this externalization of EU’s
standards unfolds. Enhanced understanding of this dynamic explains why the EU is currently the only
jurisdiction that can wield unilateral inﬂuence across a number of areas of law, ranging from competition
and privacy to health and environmental regulation. This understanding also helps explain why certain
regulations can be externalized via markets while others rely on the EU’s ability to exert inﬂuence through
its political agency. The Article further disputes the notion that the EU’s ability to externalize its rules
would reﬂect “regulatory imperialism,” as critics have suggested. Instead, it argues that the EU’s external
regulatory inﬂuence has emerged largely as an inadvertent byproduct of its internal goal to create and
strengthen the single market. The EU’s regulatory authority has been further solidiﬁed as the markets,
other states, and international institutions have been able to do little to constrain Europe’s global regulatory power. In the end, as much as the rise of the EU’s regulatory power is a product of its pursuit of
internal goals, any limits to this power are likely to stem from within the EU itself.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction1
It is common to hear Europe described today as a power of the
past. Europe is perceived to be weak militarily. Its relative economic
power is declining as Asia’s is rising. Its common currency may be
on the verge of disintegrating. On the world stage, the European
Union is thought to be waning into irrelevance due to its inability
to speak with one voice. Given its seemingly declining power status
and inability to get its way alone, the EU is perceived as needing
to retreat to weak multilateralism and international institutions
(Rubenfeld, 2004; Bradford and Posner, 2011).2
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Contrary to this prevalent perception, this Article highlights
a deeply underestimated aspect of European inﬂuence that the
discussion on global power politics overlooks: Europe’s unilateral
power to regulate global markets. The European Union sets the
global rules across a range of areas, such as food, chemicals, the
environment, competition, and the protection of privacy. EU regulations have a tangible impact on the everyday lives of citizens
around the world (Mitchener, 2002; Scheer, 2003).3 Few Americans are aware that EU regulations determine the make-up they
apply in the morning, the cereal they eat for breakfast, the software
they use on their computer, and the privacy settings they adjust on
their Facebook page. And that’s just before 8:30 a.m. The EU also
sets the rules governing the interofﬁce phone directory they use to
call a co-worker. EU regulations dictate what kind of air conditioners Americans use to cool their homes and why their children no
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See Regulatory Imperialism, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 2007 at 1; Case COMP/M.5984
Intel/McAfee (Commission decision of January 26, 2011), 2011 O.J. (C 98) 1.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2014.09.004
0144-8188/© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2770661

A. Bradford / International Review of Law and Economics 42 (2015) 158–173

longer ﬁnd soft-plastic toys in their McDonalds happy meals. This
phenomenon—the “Brussels Effect”—is the focus of this paper.
This Article explains how and why the rules and regulations
originating from Brussels have penetrated many aspects of economic life within and outside of Europe through the process of
“unilateral regulatory globalization.” Unilateral regulatory globalization takes place when a single state is able to externalize its laws
and regulations outside its borders through market mechanisms,
resulting in the globalization of standards. This process can be
distinguished from political globalization of regulatory standards
where regulatory convergence results from negotiated standards,
including international treaties or agreements among regulatory
authorities. It is also different from unilateral coercion, where one
jurisdiction imposes its rules on others through threats or sanctions. Unilateral regulatory globalization is a development where a
law of one jurisdiction migrates into another in the absence of the
former actively imposing it or the latter willingly adopting it.
Critics of globalization have claimed that trade liberalization
undermines domestic regulation. Extensive literature has emerged
regarding the “race to the bottom” phenomenon—the idea that
countries lower their regulatory standards in order to improve
their relative competitive position in the global economy (Tonelson,
2000; Murphy, 2004). Recently, many of the assumptions driving
this inﬂuential literature have been discredited (Vogel and Kagan,
2004). For example, fears of businesses relocating to pollution
havens or capital ﬂights following higher levels of corporate taxation have not materialized in large numbers.4 Indeed, scholars have
shown that international trade has frequently triggered a “race to
the top,” whereby domestic regulations have become more stringent as the global economy has become more integrated (Vogel,
1997; Vogel and Kagan, 2004; Spar and Yofﬁe, 2000; DeSombre,
2006). The “California Effect” is a term frequently used to describe
this phenomenon: due to its large market and preference for strict
consumer and environmental regulations, California is, at times,
able to set the regulatory standards for all the other U.S. states
(Vogel, 1995; Vogel and Kagan, 2004). Businesses willing to export
to California must meet its standards, and the prospect of scale
economies from uniform production standards gives these ﬁrms
an incentive to apply this same (strict) standard to their entire
production.
This Article explores the dynamics of the California Effect in a
global context. It focuses on the conditions under which a single
country can externalize its regulations on other countries. Building upon, yet going beyond, the literature on the California Effect,
it argues that the following conditions are necessary for a jurisdiction to dictate rules for global commerce: the jurisdiction must
have a large domestic market, signiﬁcant regulatory capacity, and
the propensity to enforce strict rules over inelastic targets (e.g.,
consumer markets) as opposed to elastic targets (e.g., capital). In
addition, unilateral regulatory globalization presumes that the beneﬁts of adopting a uniform global standard exceed the beneﬁts of
adhering to multiple, including laxer, regulatory standards. This is
the case in particular when the ﬁrms’ conduct or production is nondivisible, meaning that it is not legally or technically feasible, or
economically viable, for the ﬁrm to maintain different standards in
different markets.
Unpacking the determinants of unilateral regulatory globalization explains why the EU has become the predominant regulator of
global commerce and why the EU can successfully export certain
norms and not others. The EU has the world’s largest internal market, supported by strong regulatory institutions. Trading with the

4
Some examples of the race to the bottom phenomenon however remain. See
Millimet, D. & List, J. (2004). The Case of the Missing Pollution Haven Hypothesis,
J. Reg. Econ., 26(3), 239–262.
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EU requires foreign companies to adjust their conduct or production to the EU standards—which often represent the most stringent
standards—else forgo the EU market entirely. Rarely is the latter
an option. In addition, companies cannot undermine EU rules by
moving regulatory targets to another jurisdiction because the EU
primarily regulates inelastic consumer markets as opposed to more
elastic capital markets. While the EU regulates only its internal
market, multinational corporations often have an incentive to standardize their production globally and adhere to a single rule. This
converts the EU rule into a global rule—a phenomenon described
as the “de facto Brussels Effect.” Finally, after these export-oriented
ﬁrms have adjusted their business practices to meet the EU’s strict
standards, they often have the incentive to lobby their domestic
governments to adopt these same standards in an effort to level the
playing ﬁeld against their domestic, non-export-oriented competitors. This latter phenomenon converts the de facto Brussels Effect
into the “de jure Brussels Effect” (Vogel, 1995).
The Article then moves on to discuss the EU’s motivations to
externalize its regulations as well as the reasons why foreign corporations and governments generally adhere to, as opposed to
challenge, the EU rules. It disputes the critics’ notion that the Brussels Effect would reﬂect the EU’s conscious effort to engage in
“regulatory imperialism.” Instead, it argues that the EU’s external
regulatory agenda is primarily, even if not exclusively, driven by a
set of entrenched domestic policy preferences and the EU’s efforts
to create an internal market that reﬂects those preferences. The
EU’s external regulatory inﬂuence has thus emerged largely as an
inadvertent by-product of that internal goal rather than as a result
of some conscious foreign policy agenda.
The Brussels Effect rarely entails that the foreign targets of EU
regulations willingly embrace the EU standards. Instead, foreign
corporations would often prefer another rule but ﬁnd it rational
to adjust nonetheless given the opportunity costs of not doing so.
At the same time, this dynamic is different from the EU coercing others to adopt its rules. Market forces are sufﬁcient to create
“involuntary incentives” to adjust to the rules of the strict regulator. In other words, unilateral regulatory globalization entails the
dominant jurisdiction imposing an incentive to adjust, followed by
reluctant emulation by market participants. Seen this way, unilateral regulatory globalization is produced through “go-it-alone
power” by a dominant regulator, which leaves the adopters no
choice but to adhere to the rules else forgo the opportunity to trade
with Europe altogether (Gruber, 2000).
Foreign governments are similarly unenthusiastic about the
EU’s ability to externalize its regulations. Yet they can do little
to counterbalance the EU’s regulatory hegemony. Countries whose
regulatory preferences are overridden by the EU’s standards gain
nothing by entering into a regulatory race with the EU—outpacing
the EU will only leave them with even higher, and hence less
desirable, regulatory standards. They also have only an imperfect
ability to dampen the EU’s regulatory ambitions with sanctions or
by resorting to international institutions. This makes them passive spectators of the process where the markets are unleashed
to spread the EU norms and entrench them in global markets.
Given the limited ability of foreign governments or international
institutions to constrain the EU’s regulatory agenda, the greatest
check on the EU’s regulatory powers comes from within the EU
itself. As the EU’s powers grow, internal divisions within the EU will
increase. The ongoing euro crisis further fuels resentment among
the European people, contributing to a severe political backlash.
This may eventually lead to a repatriation of some regulatory powers from Brussels back to the Member States. Thus, the EU’s own
evolving conception of the limits of its regulatory authority will, in
the end, deﬁne the boundaries of its regulatory reach.
While focusing on the ability of the markets to transform EU
standards into global standards, this Article does not claim that the
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Brussels Effect is an exclusive path for global standards. There are
different paths to regulatory convergence, all of which can operate in parallel. At times, market forces create sufﬁcient incentivizes
for foreign corporations to adopt EU standards. At other times, the
EU has to, or it chooses to, resort to political harmonization that
entails persuasion or coercion such as diplomacy, trade conditionality or economic sanctions. These other mechanism of regulatory
convergence are important but have been discussed extensively
elsewhere (Damro, 2012; Büthe and Mattli, 2010, 2011; Sabel and
Zeitlin, 2008; Linos, 2011). The purpose of this contribution is not
to review the existing literature on those other mechanisms of regulatory inﬂuence but explain the logic of the Brussels Effect, which
is less well understood. However, this Article seeks to explain when
and why the Brussels Effect presents a more attractive method
of inﬂuencing global regulatory environment compared to these
alternatives. It explains the distinct advantages that the market
based harmonization has over political harmonization for the EU
but also explain why, despite these clear advantages, the EU continues to embrace multilateralism and pursue political harmonization
in some instances.
This Article contributes to the scholarship on international regulatory convergence (Drezner, 2005; Simmons, 2004). It also engages
directly with the literature on the direction of possible regulatory
races, such as whether the race to the top or the race to the bottom is
more pervasive in explaining regulatory outcomes globally. While
the Article builds on the existing theory of the California Effect, it
goes beyond it in two critical ways. First, it seeks to outline the
precise conditions that allow an upward regulatory convergence
to take place. While the California Effect is recognized as a phenomenon, existing scholarship has not explained its actual scope
beyond anecdotes and individual examples. Second, it uncovers
and explains a perhaps most signiﬁcant example of the California
Effect—its global occurrence—that has been undertheorized and
underestimated as an empirical phenomenon.
The existing scholarship on the California Effect has recognized
the importance of market size and scale economies as a source
of jurisdiction’s external regulatory clout. At the same time, it
has failed to acknowledge factors such as regulatory capacity and
inelasticity as key components of the theory, and it has overlooked
criteria other than scale economies as factors that can prevent a
company from producing different varieties for different markets.
Thus, the discussion of the Brussels Effect provides a more nuanced
theory of the conditions under which a single jurisdiction can exert
regulatory inﬂuence outside its borders. Second, the global regulatory clout that the EU exercises via the Brussels Effect has been
vastly underappreciated. Scholarship on international regulatory
convergence has focused on a country’s market size as the best
proxy for its external regulatory inﬂuence (Drezner, 2005; Wirth,
2007; Damro, 2012). This Article, however, shows that market
power alone does not explain international regulatory outcomes.
A more accurate and complete understanding of the conditions
underlying the Brussels Effect explains why the EU, as opposed to
any other large economy, can unilaterally supply global standards.
In addition, this Article makes the following contributions: ﬁrst,
it shows that the Brussels Effect is more pervasive and widespread
than thus far recognized. The current literature on upward regulatory races focuses almost exclusively on environmental regulation
(Holzinger and Sommerer, 2011). Even there, scholars claim that
regulatory globalization through the California Effect is constrained
to “only a highly limited subset of environmental laws” and largely
excluded in the case of production (as opposed to product) standards or consumer protection (Vogel and Kagan, 2004; Scharpf,
1996; Swire, 1996; Macey, 2003). This view fails to capture the full
impact of the phenomenon. This Article shows that the logic of the
Brussels Effect reaches a broad range of regulations aimed at protecting the interest of consumers and the general public, whether

those regulations relate to product, environmental, privacy or competition standards.
Second, the existing literature focuses on the race to the top that
takes place when a lax foreign regulator formally adopts the strict
rule of the lead regulator (Vogel and Kagan, 2004; Simmons, 2004;
Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). This attention to “de jure regulatory convergence” fails to account for an important phenomenon
that takes place in the absence of formal changes to legal rules. In
reality, this type of formal “trading up” often fails to occur. Instead,
we typically see only a “de facto regulatory convergence” whereby
much of global business is conducted under unilateral EU rules even
when other states continue to maintain their own rules. This is
true, for instance, with respect to U.S. antitrust (competition) laws,
privacy laws, and rules on food safety. Unilateral regulatory globalization does not need to elicit a formal regulatory response from
another nation—often there is no race to the top or de jure Brussels
Effect. The EU law governs whether other countries follow suit or
not. Seen in this light, the Brussels Effect is more about one jurisdiction’s ability to override others than it is about triggering an upward
regulatory race.
It is true that at times this de facto Brussels Effect is reinforced
with a de jure Brussels Effect. This is the case when other countries’
legislators afﬁrmatively adopt the EU’s strict standards. But even
here, the path to regulatory convergence follows a sequence different from what we have become accustomed to in other contexts.
Corporations’ de facto adjustment to the EU rules paves the way
for legislators’ de jure implementation of these rules rather than
the other way around. Thus, the implementation problem of the de
jure Brussels Effect is solved from the outset.
Third, the theory of unilateral regulatory globalization departs
from existing scholarship on the relationship between regulatory
convergence and regulatory power. Daniel Drezner has argued that
great-power consensus leads to regulatory convergence whereas
great-power disagreement leads to regulatory divergence and the
emergence of rival standards (Drezner, 2005). Which rival standard
trumps the other depends on the regulatory powers’ relative ability to seek allies supporting their respective regulatory preferences
and reach a tipping point after which the rival states need to switch
standards. In contrast to Drezner, this Article shows that de facto
convergence can take place in the midst of a great-power disagreement. When the conditions for the Brussels Effect exist, rival
standards between two equal powers fail to materialize. Instead,
the outcome of the regulatory race is predetermined: the more
stringent regulator prevails.
Finally, prevailing theories on regulatory globalization explain
the emergence of regulatory convergence as a result of cooperation or coercion. The Brussels Effect differs because it falls between
the two. Beth Simmons, for instance, shows how in the case of
capital adequacy requirements and accounting standards for public offerings, countries with lenient regulatory standards have an
incentive to adopt other countries’ stricter standards in order to
attract foreign capital (Simmons, 2004). This amounts to a marketdriven race to the top as the followers have a clear economic
incentive to adopt the desirable rules that leave everyone better
off. In contrast, unilateral regulatory globalization is rarely a process of voluntary harmonization: foreign corporations would often
prefer another rule but ﬁnd it rational to adjust nonetheless given
the opportunity costs of not doing so. Yet the EU is not coercing others to adopt its rules either. Market forces are sufﬁcient to create
“involuntary incentives” to adjust to the rules of the strict regulator. In other words, unilateral regulatory globalization entails the
dominant jurisdiction imposing an incentive to adjust, followed by
reluctant emulation by market participants.
In addition to advancing the literature on regulatory globalization, this Article makes a contribution to the literature on state
power in international relations. While traditional tools of power
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have waned in importance—it is increasingly difﬁcult to exert inﬂuence through raw military power or rely on economic sanctions
or conditional incentives—regulatory power that the EU possesses
is more durable, more deployable, and less easily undermined by
others (Gelb, 2010).
This Article proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the conditions under which the Brussels Effect takes place. Section 3
discusses the reasons that cause the EU to externalize its regulations and explains when this externalization takes place through
markets as opposed to through the EU’s political agency. Section 4
discusses the reasons that cause foreign corporations to adopt EU
rules and foreign governments to yield to, rather than counterbalance, the Brussels Effect. The Conclusion focuses on the implications
of the EU’s global regulatory role within and beyond the EU, and
evaluates the likelihood of its persistence in the future. The purpose
of this Article is descriptive. This Article will not discuss whether
strict regulatory standards are efﬁcient or desirable. Instead, it provides an account for why and how trade liberalization can lead to
stringent standards, why this follows a process of unilateral regulatory globalization, why today these global standards are set
predominantly by the EU, and why the rest of the world can do
little about it.
2. Conditions for unilateral regulatory globalization
This section lays the theoretical foundation for the Brussels
Effect. It identiﬁes the conditions for and the mechanism through
which the externalization of one state’s standards unfolds. These
conditions also explain why some regulations, but not others, are
conducive to the Brussels Effect. They also explain why the EU is
currently the predominant regulatory regime that can wield unilateral inﬂuence across a number of areas of law and why other large
economies, including the US and China, lack this kind of power.
Contrary to existing accounts or EU’s market size as the key
determinant of its regulatory power, this section argues that market
size alone does not determine whether any given country’s standards can be globalized. The state must also have the regulatory
capacity and the regulatory propensity to convert its market size
into actual regulatory inﬂuence. By “regulatory capacity,” I refer to
institutional structures that are capable of producing and enforcing regulations effectively. By “regulatory propensity,” I refer to
prevailing domestic preferences for strict regulatory standards and
the predisposition to regulate inelastic targets. It further argues
that only strict standards regulating targets that cannot move—that
is, inelastic targets—ensure that a country’s regulations will override alternative regulatory standards and make other jurisdictions’
regulatory authority obsolete without being punished by markets
or constrained by other jurisdictions’ regulatory responses. Finally,
EU standards become global standards only when the beneﬁts of
adhering to a single global standard are greater than the beneﬁts
of taking advantage of laxer standards in lenient jurisdictions—in
other words, when targets’ conduct or production is non-divisible.
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increase demand on its home market, the less dependent it is on
access to the market of the importing jurisdiction.
Focusing on large domestic markets alone, several states could
qualify as potential global standard setters. The EU is the largest
economy in the world with a GDP of approximately $17 trillion. It
consists of a single market with 500 million consumers. The EU has
a quarter of the countries’ combined Gross National Product (GNP)
worldwide, and is the largest importer of goods and services. The
EU’s internal market is also constantly growing as new countries
are joining the EU. Of course, the United States, China, and Japan
also possess domestic markets large enough to use access to their
markets as leverage. The United States has an economy of over $15
trillion, almost the same size as the EU, while China has an economy
of over $8 trillion and Japan has one of over $5 trillion.
When assessing the value of market access, foreign corporations
also consider the adjustment costs that are necessary to enter the
market. A foreign producer will have an incentive to comply with
the importing jurisdiction’s standard when the beneﬁts of market
access outweigh the adjustment costs. The larger the importing
market and the lower the adjustment costs relative to the beneﬁts of market access, the more likely that adjustment will take
place (Young, 2003). In the case of consumer goods, the beneﬁts
of market access are determined by the number and afﬂuence of
potential consumers of that product as well as by the opportunity costs of forgoing those consumers. These opportunity costs
are particularly high when demand in the corporation’s home market or in alternative third markets is limited. The adjustment costs
can consist of initial set-up costs and recurring compliance costs.
They vary with the signiﬁcance of cross-border differentials that
determine the degree of adjustment and various other compliance
costs associated with market access, including licenses or approval
processes.
With the world’s largest consumer market consisting of a high
proportion of afﬂuent consumers, most producers are dependent
on their ability to supply the EU market. They may be able to divert
part of their exports elsewhere, but few are in a position to abandon the EU market altogether and recoup the forgone revenue in
other markets. The distinctly high value of market access to the
EU explains why many producers are prepared to incur signiﬁcant
adjustment costs to retain their ability to trade with the EU.
However, the EU’s relative market power varies across industries. Insufﬁcient market power therefore always sets boundaries
on the EU’s global regulatory clout. In instances where adjustment
costs are high and alternative markets exist, producers are likely to
forgo the EU market and divert trade elsewhere. For instance, the
EU has not been effective in externalizing its regulations of automobiles to the U.S. The EU’s End-of-life Vehicles Directive, which
regulates recyclable components and toxic heavy metals contained
in automobiles, has had an insigniﬁcant impact on U.S. car manufacturers, who sell virtually no cars to the EU. At the same time,
EU regulation has been successfully externalized on Korean and
Japanese manufactures that have a strong presence in the European
market (Schapiro, 2004).

2.1. Market power

2.2. Regulatory capacity

In the global economy, power is correlated with the relative size
of any given country’s internal market. To secure access to important markets, producers gravitate toward adopting the standards
prevailing in those markets (Drezner, 2005; Damro, 2012). The
larger the market of the importing country relative to the market of
the exporting country, the more likely the Brussels Effect will occur.
More accurately, the greater the ratio of exports to the importing
jurisdiction relative to sales in the home or third country markets,
the more power the importing jurisdiction wields. In contrast, the
greater the exporter’s ability to divert trade to third markets or

Large market size alone does not explain a state’s ability to
project its regulatory preferences on others. Being a regulatory
power is a conscious choice pursued by a state rather than something that is inherent in its market size. Not all states with
large markets become sources of global standards. The state must
also have the regulatory capacity to translate its market power
into tangible regulatory inﬂuence. Without regulatory expertise
and resources to enforce its rules, a country cannot effectively
exert authority over market participants—within or outside of its
jurisdiction. An important element of regulatory capacity is the
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authority to impose sanctions in case of non-compliance. Only
jurisdictions with the capacity to impose signiﬁcant costs on others by excluding non-complying ﬁrms from their markets can force
regulatory adjustment (Bach and Newman, 2007; Damro, 2012).
The degree to which a country has regulatory capacity sets
important limits to a country’s ability to exert global regulatory
authority. For instance, many Asian economies are growing at a
staggering rate, but it will take time before their GDP growth
translates into regulatory experience and institutional capacity to
enforce their norms. Thus, acknowledging that sophisticated regulatory institutions are required to activate the power of sizable
domestic markets, few jurisdictions outside the U.S. or the EU have
the capacity to be regulators with global reach.
The U.S. administrative agencies’ capacity to promulgate and
enforce rules in the United States is well understood. The rise of
the regulatory state in the EU is more recent, yet the institutional
developments that accompanied the creation of the single market have bestowed the EU with substantial regulatory capacity
(Majone, 1994). The European Commission is the EU’s executive
arm. The Commission enjoys substantial independent decisionmaking authority. It proposes legislation and ensures that the
regulations and directives adopted by the Council and the Parliament are implemented in the Member States. If an individual
Member State fails to implement certain regulation, the Commission has the authority to challenge the non-complying Member
States before the European courts.
Vesting the EU institutions with the expertise, powers, and
resources to guard the common market and to guarantee the rights
and responsibilities embedded in European Treaties has been integral to the entire European project. The EU’s regulatory capacity
has also gradually expanded over the years as a larger set of
regulations have become subject to qualiﬁed majority voting as
opposed to unanimity and as the European Parliament—known
for its pro-regulation stance—has gained inﬂuence in the EU’s legislative process. The EU institutions have acquired these increased
powers as a result of the need to further integrate the common
market and pursue joint gains from deeper integration.
The EU’s regulatory capacity varies across different policy areas.
It is most extensive in areas like trade and competition policy,
which are central to establishing and strengthening the single market. It is most limited in sensitive areas such as common foreign and
security policy, where the individual Member States have retained
substantial authority. Naturally, the EU’s global regulatory power
is limited to policy areas in which the Member States have ceded
either exclusive or shared regulatory competence to the EU. However, this is a largely theoretical limit since the EU has, over the
years, acquired extensive regulatory capacity in all areas relating
to the single market. And these are the very regulations that carry
the attributes that lend themselves to externalization. However,
there are important policy areas where EU member states have
not transferred powers to the EU—including energy policy and corporate taxation—imposing limits on the EU’s external inﬂuence in
these matters.

2.3. Preference for strict rules

that support a pro-regulation climate. Both are needed for a large
market to supply global standards.
The domestic preference for strict regulation is more likely to be
found in countries with high levels of income (Guasch and Hahn,
1999). Wealthier countries can better afford pursuing consumer
protection at the expense of the proﬁtability of their ﬁrms (Guasch
and Hahn, 1999; Vogel and Kagan, 2004). This, together with the
lack of regulatory capacity, explains why emerging markets are
unlikely to exercise rule-making power that would match their
growing market size.
But even wealthy countries differ in their predisposition to regulatory intervention. To be a global regulator requires that the
state subscribes to strict domestic standards that prevail over more
lenient standards by the simple virtue of being the most stringent.
Until the 1980s, the U.S. set the global norms in consumer and environmental regulation, leading European ﬁrms to adjust to higher
standards originating from the U.S. Since then, the roles have been
reversed as the EU has increasingly adopted tighter standards of
consumer and environmental protection while the U.S. has failed to
follow the EU’s lead (Lofsted and Vogel, 2001; Laïdi, 2007; Keleman
and Vogel, 2007). The only way for the U.S. to supersede the European standards today would be to adopt even higher standards
itself—something that it does not consider to be welfare-enhancing
and thus in its interest.
The EU’s domestic preference for stringent regulation reﬂects
its aversion to risk and commitment to a social market economy.
European consumers rank environment and food safety higher than
crime and terrorism when asked to evaluate various risks, leading
to distinctly high levels of consumer and environmental protection
(Laïdi, 2007).5 Further, the EU follows the precautionary principle,
which dictates that precautionary regulatory action is proper even
in the absence of an absolute, quantiﬁable certainty of the risk, as
long as there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects may be inconsistent with the chosen level
of protection (Harrell, 2010).6 In contrast, the risk must ﬁrst be
quantiﬁed and found to be unreasonable before regulatory intervention can be justiﬁed in the U.S.7 The U.S. regulatory agencies
are also guided by the cost-beneﬁt analysis, which forces them to
substantiate that the beneﬁts of intervention outweigh its costs. To
generalize, the U.S. is, therefore, more sensitive to the costs of regulatory action and the “false-positive” regulations whereas the EU
emphasizes the costs of inaction and the risks of “false-negatives.”
These differences often lead to more extensive regulation originating from the EU.
The extent of regulation at the EU level also reﬂects the efforts by
export-oriented EU ﬁrms to seek consistent and predictable regulatory frameworks. Uniform regulations have abolished obstacles for
doing business within the community. To pursue community-wide
regulatory harmonization, the European Commission has often
found it easier to “harmonize up” instead of make some member
states lower their domestic standards (Vogel, 2012). And once all
European ﬁrms have incurred the adjustment costs of conforming
to common European standards, they have preferred those standards to be institutionalized globally. Hence, to level the playing
ﬁeld and ensure the competitiveness of European ﬁrms, EU corporations have sought to export these standards to third countries.

Regulatory capacity must further be supplemented with the
political will to deploy it. Thus, the jurisdiction must also have the
propensity to promulgate strict regulatory standards. The existing literature focusing on regulatory capacity often erroneously
assumes that the mere existence of this capacity automatically
entails the political willingness to employ it. However, while regulatory capacity depends on the sophistication and effectiveness
of country’s regulatory architecture, the existence of regulatory
propensity depends on the prevailing political economy conditions

5
See also Special Environmental Eurobarometer, “Attitudes of Europeans
Towards Environment,” available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/archives/
ebs/ebs 217 en.pdf.
6
See The European Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle
(February 2, 2000).
7
See Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448
U.S. 607, 642–46 (1980). See also Executive Order 13,563: Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
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Of course, the EU also fails to become the source of global standards in areas where the regulatory propensity—the preference for
high standards—is absent. This can be true EU-wide, where all or
most member states share a preference for low regulation. Often
the missing regulatory propensity, however, reﬂects preference
heterogeneity within the EU. For example, the EU is divided on
issues like corporate tax harmonization with countries like Ireland
(with its 12.5% corporate tax rate) opposing any step toward tax
harmonization and countries like France (with its 34% corporate
tax rate) endorsing common rules. And when it comes to ﬁnancial
regulation of any kind, the U.K.’s opposition is almost guaranteed.
The EU’s regulatory clout is also limited in instances where
other states have a preference for higher standards. At times, the
U.S. prefers higher standards than the EU does. For instance, the
U.S.’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), targeted at
improving corporate responsibility in the post-Enron environment,
is widely perceived as establishing the highest global standard for
corporate governance.8 Where the U.S. opts for strict standards, it
can become the source of global standards, assuming the conditions for unilateral regulatory globalization are met. As the U.S.’s
recent regulatory pursuits have predominantly targeted the ﬁnancial sector, it is less likely they will be converted to global standards
because of the relative elasticity of capital, as discussed below. For
instance, it is debated whether the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley was to
ratchet up standards worldwide or to cause U.S. stock exchanges
to lose listings of foreign corporations (Coffee, 2002; Sherwoord,
2005). In any event, it is evident that the EU’s ability to set the
global rules alone is always contingent on it having a preference
for the highest rule, which may not always be the case.
In addition to the situation where the relatively permissive
EU standard yields to a stricter foreign standard, there may also
be situations where one country is stricter on one dimension of
a regulation and another country stricter on another dimension.
In instances where the corporations are unable to segment the
markets, corporations may thus end up adhering to even stricter
standards than any single regulator would have required. This situation would be an even more penetrating version of unilateral
regulatory globalization, where the global rule would be ratcheted
up by a combination of the strictest rules provided by different
jurisdictions.

2.4. Inelastic targets
Conventionally, we think that markets are able to punish inefﬁciently stringent regulators. An economic theory of regulatory
competition among jurisdictions would suggest that if the EU’s
regulatory standards were too high, it would lose business and foreign investment to jurisdictions with more attractive regulatory
environments. In other words, a state’s ability to override another
state’s preference for lenient standards is compromised if the target can escape the strict regulation by simply relocating. This is the
dynamic that triggers races to the bottom as producers seek less
constraining regulatory environments.
But this assumption is based on the premise that the targets
of the regulation are mobile. The EU avoids this circumvention
of its standards by primarily regulating consumer markets, such
as product or food safety. When a state regulates targets that
are inelastic—as is the case in the EU’s regulation of consumer
markets—markets have a limited ability to punish that state for any
regulatory excesses. Consumers are likely to stay in Europe and
businesses have the choice of either providing them with goods

8

Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002).
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conforming to EU standards or forgoing the entire market. They
rarely opt for the latter.
The inelasticity of consumer markets can be contrasted with a
global corporation’s strategic decision on where to incorporate or
enlist or to a shipping company’s decision regarding the ﬂag under
which its ship is sailing. While not perfectly elastic, capital is significantly more mobile than consumer markets. If the EU, for instance,
tried to harmonize corporate tax levels at excessively high levels,
a number of corporations could ﬂee its jurisdiction and incorporate elsewhere. Similarly, if the EU was to impose a tax on ﬁnancial
transactions, trading activity could be diverted to ﬁnancial centers
outside the EU (Chafﬁn, 2011). Thus, the EU’s choice of focusing on
consumer markets in its regulatory endeavors thus far has further
reinforced its role as a global standard setter whose regulations
cannot be undermined by market forces and the elasticity of its
targets.
2.5. Non-divisibility of standards
The above conditions only ensure that the strict jurisdiction is
able to regulate extraterritorially. Meeting these conditions does
not, by itself, mean that the strict standard is globalized. The
Brussels Effect is only triggered when the exporter, after having
converted its products or business practices to comply with the
importing jurisdiction’s strict standards, decides to apply this new
standard to its products or conduct worldwide. In other words,
global standards emerge only when corporations voluntarily opt
to comply with a single standard determined by the most stringent
regulator, making other regulators obsolete in the process.
The exporter has an incentive to adopt a global standard whenever its production or conduct is non-divisible across different
markets or when the beneﬁts of a uniform standard due to scale
economies exceed the costs of forgoing lower production costs
in less regulated markets. Complying with just one regulatory
standard allows a corporation to maintain a single production process, which is less costly than tailoring its production to meet divergent regulatory standards (Drezner, 2005; Lazer, 2011). A single
standard also facilitates the preservation of a uniform global brand
(Vogel, 2012). Thus, unilateral regulatory globalization follows
from the non-divisibility of a corporation’s production or conduct.
Non-divisibility characterizes often market participants’
responses to the EU’s health, environmental and other product
standards. An illustrative example is European chemical regulation
(“REACH”), which applies to all companies seeking to enter the
EU market.9 Numerous US manufacturers, who would ﬁnd it too
costly to develop different products for different consumer markets, choose to conform their entire global chemical production to
the EU standard. Dow Chemicals announced all of its production to
be REACH-consistent, whether they are sold in the EU or elsewhere
(Vogel, 2012). Large cosmetics producers such as Revlon, Unilevel
and L’Oreal, have similarly reformulated all their products to
be REACH-compatible, while Estee Lauder uses a single safety
standard for 95% of its production (Vogel, 2012). These examples
show that scale economies associated in a single global production
process therefore often allow the EU to effectively dictate the
global product standards.
Only this type of non-divisibility—the importance of scale
economies—has traditionally been associated with the California
Effect. However, non-divisibility comes in various forms. Legal
and technical non-divisibility similarly steer companies toward
uniform standards. Legal non-divisibility can be seen in global

9
See Commission Regulation 1907/2006, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 December 2006 Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation
and Restriction of Chemicals, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1 (hereinafter REACH).
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mergers, which cannot be consummated on a jurisdiction-byjurisdiction basis—the most stringent competition jurisdiction
gets to determine the fate of the transaction worldwide (Bradford,
2011). One of the most famous examples of the EU’s global regulatory clout was its decision to prohibit the $42 billion proposed
acquisition of Honeywell International by General Electric.10 When
the EU blocked this transaction involving two U.S. companies, it
was irrelevant that the U.S. competition authorities had previously
cleared the transaction: the acquisition was banned worldwide as
it was legally impossible to let the merger proceed in one market
and prohibit it in another. Similarly, the EU often gets to dictate the
code of conduct for dominant companies worldwide. For example,
the EU has imposed record-high ﬁnes and behavioral remedies
against dominant U.S. companies, including Microsoft and Intel.11
Technical non-divisibility often applies for the regulation of
privacy. For example, the EU forces companies like Google to
amend their data storage and other business practices to conform to European privacy standards (Mitchener, 2002; Gray et al.,
2008).12 Facing a technical difﬁculty to isolate its data collection
for the EU, Google is forced to adjust its global operations to the
most demanding EU standard. Another example involving technical non-divisibility is the EU’s emissions trading scheme (“ETS”), a
cornerstone of the EU’s climate change policy. The ETS entails that
all airlines, including foreign ones, have to buy emission permits for
all their ﬂights that depart from or land at European airports.13 This
way, airlines cannot limit their compliance to the part of the journey that takes place in the European airspace, making the scheme
non-divisible. For instance, on a ﬂight from San Francisco to London,
only nine percent of the emissions are calculated to occur in the EU
airspace (twenty-nine percent, thirty-seven percent, and twentyﬁve percent of the emissions occurring over the US, Canada, and
the high seas, respectively).14 Yet the airline must acquire emission permits for each ton of emissions released across the entire
ﬂight since the point of landing is the EU else pay a ﬁne or, even
more severely, could be banned from European airports.
Of course, the line between a technical and economic nondivisibility can at times be blurred. In principle, American Airlines
ﬂying from San Francisco to London could technically divide its
journey and make a stopover on some island in the Atlantic Ocean
in order to shorten the journey that becomes subject to obligations
under the ETS. However, this would lengthen the duration of the
ﬂight and make the service less competitive and hence less valuable. Technical non-divisibility problem would hence be replaced
by economic non-divisibility problem. Another feature of technical
non-divisibility is that its existence may create new incentives for
corporations to develop products or technologies that can better
be divided. Even if technology companies cannot today separate
all internet searches for technical reasons, such difﬁculties may be
overcome with new technological developments.
A particularly interesting example of non-divisibility—partly
technical and partly economic type—comes from the EU’s strict

10
Case COMP/M.2220 General Electric/Honeywell (July 3, 2001); in contrast, see
Press Release U.S. Dept. of justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in
Merger between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), available at:
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press releases/2001/8140.pdf.
11
COMP/37.990 Intel (May 13, 2009); COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft (2004).
12
See Legal Confusion on Internet Privacy: The Clash of Data Civilizations, Economist,
June 17, 2010, at 2 available at: http://www.economist.com/node/16377097.
13
Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19
November 2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities
in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community
(OJ 2009 L 8, p. 3).
14
Statement of Nancy N. Young, ‘The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme: A Violation of International Law’ (July 27, 2011) 4, at: http://
republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/ﬁle/TestimonyAviation/2011-07-27-%
20Young.pdf.

regulation of Genetically Modiﬁed Organisms (“GMOs”). At ﬁrst
glance, it appears that GMOs should be divisible and thus not
amenable to the Brussels Effect. In principle, U.S. farmers could
separate their production and cultivate both GMO and non-GMO
varieties destined for domestic and export markets, respectively.
Yet such division can be difﬁcult in practice. The GMO crops must
be segregated from the time they are planted throughout the
processing and marketing chain. This entails separating growing
areas and preventing pollen drift from GMO ﬁelds to non-GMO
ﬁelds.15 Producers and distributors must also use separate equipment, storage areas, and shipping containers, and establish trait
identiﬁcation systems that allow for the tracking of produce
from the farm to the consumer (Hanrahan, 2010). The speciﬁc
processes through which U.S. farmers gather and transport their
crops for distribution often make their harvests inseparable in
practice (Young, 2003). At the minimum, separation of production
is costly. This technical and economic non-divisibility of GMO
production has led some farmers to choose to forgo the risks and
costs of separation, and converge to the strictest standard by only
cultivating EU-approved GMO crops—irrespective of where these
crops are sold (Young, 2003; Vogel, 2012).
However, when products do not call for a uniform standard, such
as when markets are divisible or scale economies insufﬁcient to
justify a uniform standard, the EU can at best achieve compliance
with its standard but not globalization of those standards. Seen
this way, divisibility sets clear boundaries to the market power that
any given jurisdiction can wield. Car manufacturers are responding
to different national and regional emission standards with diversiﬁed technologies in an effort to minimize risks and maximize
returns. DVDs offer another example. They have different region
codes allowing ﬁlm distributors to segregate release dates, content restrictions, and price across regions. Thus, the Brussels Effect
is unlikely whenever the ﬁrm’s costs of customizing its conduct
or production to different rules are low. Labor markets are also
divisible, as long as scale economies do not require the producer to
concentrate production into a single production location. Adhering to one global minimum wage across jurisdictions, for instance,
entails few scale economies. A corporation can maintain different standards in different jurisdictions without difﬁculty—ranging
from working hours and vacation policies to retirement plans and
collective labor strategies in different jurisdictions. When employing labor in Europe, foreign ﬁrms have to follow the EU’s labor
rules, which does not preclude them from being able to take advantage of divergent (and presumably lower) standards in their home
markets.
The above discussion reveals that the emergence of a global
regulatory power requires the presence of both exogenous and
endogenous conditions. The global economic environment determines the relative market power whereas the technological
developments and corporations’ business practices determine
the existence or inexistence of non-divisibility. These are factors that are largely exogenous and hence less of a product of
a political process that determines what to regulate and how.
In contrast, regulatory capacity, preference for strict standards
and the choice to regulate inelastic targets reﬂect built-in policy
choices by individual governments. Some governments invest in
building regulatory institutions whereas others do not see these
institutions as a priority. The government’s decision to regulate
inelastic targets with strict standards is even more clearly a political choice, which in most countries reﬂects underlying preferences
of the citizenry. These exogenous factors, combined with those
are “chosen” by the jurisdiction, together determine the global

15
See Case C-442/09 Karl Heinz Bablok and Others v Freistaat Bayern (September 6,
2011).
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distribution of regulatory power and bestow the EU as the most
inﬂuential regulator in the world.
3. The EU’s motivations for supplying global standards
The EU’s exercise of global regulatory clout can spring from various motivations—both external and internal. Some commentators
argue that the EU’s external policies reﬂect “imperialistic” objectives (Zielonka, 2008; Kogan, 2005) whereas others emphasize the
EU’s role as a benevolent hegemon (Manners, 2002). This Section
argues that the charges of regulatory imperialism are misguided
when seeking to explain the origins of the Brussels Effect. A more
compelling account suggests that the EU is guided primarily by
internal motivations stemming from its need to preserve the single market without undermining the competitiveness of European
companies. That the Brussels Effect does not reﬂect primarily an
external agenda does not, however, mean that such an agenda is
missing altogether. The EU has numerous other ways to pursue
global regulatory harmonization. This Section explains when and
why the EU relies on the Brussels Effect to do the work of regulatory
harmonization and, conversely, when and why it resorts to more
active political means to accomplish its regulatory agenda.
3.1. External motivations
In contrast to the U.S.’s unilateralism in international affairs, the
EU is often portrayed as a champion of multilateral cooperation and
universal norms (Rubenfeld, 2004). However, the EU’s commitment
to multilateralism and universalism must be qualiﬁed. The EU is
an inﬂuential global player with the ability and the willingness to
shape the international order to its liking. It seeks to vigorously
promote its interests in the global stage, both unilaterally and multilaterally. In doing so, the EU acts like any great power with the
desire to ensure that international norms reﬂect its preferences
(Bradford and Posner, 2011).
Some scholars suggest that the EU’s motivations are
imperialistic—that the EU is, in fact, seeking to exert political
and economic domination over other countries. The EU does have
signiﬁcant leverage over countries that seek closer cooperation
with, or eventually membership in, the EU. The EU also actively
exports its standards through bilateral agreements—most glaringly, though accession agreements and partnership treaties. But
even outside of its immediate sphere of inﬂuence, critics maintain
that the EU is engaged in a novel form of imperialism. Instead
of pursuing its goals through military and political instruments,
the EU has been accused of relying on economic and bureaucratic
tools of dominion over countries that are dependent on access
to its vast domestic market.16 Lawrence A. Kogan, criticizing
the EU’s extensive regulatory reach in environmental and food
safety matters, puts it bluntly: “[T]he EU has embarked upon an
adventure in environmental cultural imperialism. This is a global
practice reminiscent of an earlier European colonial era. And the
fact that Europe is using “soft power” to do it hardly makes it more
palatable to people who will be unable to feed themselves as a
result” (Kogan, 2005; Drucker, 2005).
While critics claim that the EU is exporting its standards without
the consent of other states, the EU counters that it is not engaged
in coercion—it is simply enforcing the norms of the single market
equally on domestic and foreign players and merely asking others to play by its rules when operating on its home market. The EU
further legitimizes its strategies by claiming that its values and policies are normatively desirable and universally applicable (Stiglitz,

16
See, e.g., Regulatory Imperialism, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 2007 at 1; see also Europe v.
U.S. Business, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 2008.
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2007; Manners, 2008).17 Seen in this light, the EU’s externalization
of its regulatory preferences reﬂects altruistic purposes of a benign
hegemon. As a champion of norms that serve global welfare, the
EU wants to create a rule-based world and offer an alternative to
the more controversial and self-serving worldview advanced by
the U.S. A commitment to a social welfare state and a cautious attitude toward risk guides the EU’s global agenda and steers it toward
extensive regulation of the global economy—the protection of the
environment, health care, precaution in the ﬁeld of biotechnology,
and various welfare rights. By emphasizing the universal beneﬁts
of its global regulatory agenda, the EU often succeeds in obscuring the de facto unilateralism that drives its implementation. Yet
even if the EU was able to portray itself as a benevolent, normative
power that is advancing universal norms (Manners, 2002; Leonard,
2005; Smith, 2005), skeptics point out that the notion of a normative power has neo-colonial undertones as the EU is exporting
its “standards of civilization” (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002; Diez,
2006).
The EU’s active role in the ﬁght against climate change presents
one example of regulation that is presumably driven by largely
benevolent motives. Climate change is a global problem that
requires a global response. The EU has a limited capacity to mitigate
climate change alone if other states continue to emit greenhouse
gases into the atmosphere. The EU has led efforts to conclude a new
and more potent global climate change treaty. Yet the difﬁculties
associated with international treaty negotiations have given the EU
the imperative to act unilaterally. The EU’s defense of its unilateral
regulation is that it is acting in the collective interest to provide a
global public good: mitigation of climate change.
The EU’s own experience in creating a common market reinforces the EU’s willingness to pursue a global order based on
predictable rules. In forming the EU, the Member States retained
their sovereignty. The only way to bind them to the common
European enterprise was to have them adhere to common rules
designed to create an internal market. More regulation meant more
predictability and stability. This has fostered a belief within the EU
that an extensive regulatory system is needed to preserve global
public goods. The EU takes the view that trade liberalization without simultaneous harmonization of policies fails. This, for the EU,
offers the most efﬁcient and universally valid model of economic
and political integration (Zielonka, 2008).
The EU also emphasizes the strong democratic backing for its
regulatory stance. The European Commission has described the
EU’s commitment to further its social agenda as part of its trade
policy as “forging collective preferences”—cultivating the idea that
the EU is indeed concerned about the social effects of economic
integration and justifying its measures against foreign entrants as
legitimate policies reﬂecting social choices made collectively by
Europeans (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2006; Habermas, 2006; Ruggie,
1982).18
In the end, any entity that is willing to shape the international
order—whether for self-serving or more altruistic motives—must
do so with the means available to it. In the case of the EU, regulatory
power is all it has. Lacking traditional means of power, the EU’s
greatest global inﬂuence is accomplished through the norms that it
has the competence to promulgate. In the absence of military power
or unconstrained economic power, the EU can exercise genuine

17
See Art. 3(5) of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European
Union; See also Jose M. Barroso, [the president of the European Commission], Europe’s Rising Global Role, in http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
europe-s-rising-global-role (Project Syndicate, Dec. 18, 2009).
18
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referred to as an “embedded liberalism” compromise.
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unilateral power only by ﬁxing the standards of behavior for the
rest of the world (Laïdi, 2007).
3.2. Internal motivations
For those skeptical of the EU’s benevolent motives, the EU is
simply seeking to level the playing ﬁeld by exporting its costly
regulations abroad under the guise of concern for consumer and
environmental health and safety (Kogan, 2005). According to the
Czech president Vaclav Klaus, “the claims for quasi-universal social
rights are disguised . . . attempts to protect high-cost producers in
highly regulated countries, with unsustainable welfare standards,
against cheaper labor in more productive countries” (Zielonka,
2008).
A concern for EU corporations’ competitiveness offers a compelling explanation for the EU’s global regulatory agenda. Europe is
committed to the welfare state and the sustainability of its economic policies. Yet the failure to export its standards to others
would put European ﬁrms at a competitive disadvantage. By acting as a global regulator, the EU can defend its social preferences
without compromising the competitiveness of its industries. The
worry about EU airlines’ competitiveness was explicitly included
as a rationale to include foreign airlines into the EU’s emissions
trading scheme (Rahim, 2011). If foreign companies adhere to EU
norms on the European market, the import-competing industries
are assured a level playing ﬁeld. If the EU’s norms further spread to
third countries, the EU can ensure that its export-oriented ﬁrms are
not disadvantaged in those markets. This account of the EU’s motivations is particularly persuasive when one focuses on the private
interests as drivers of the EU’s regulatory policies and assumes that
regulators are responsive to these interests.
The push for externalization of EU standards is reinforced by
a peculiar constellation of domestic politics, whereby environmentalists or consumer advocates and corporations join forces in
lobbying for the globalization of EU standards. While often in disagreement, both environmentalists and corporate interests beneﬁt
from the EU imposing its standards on foreign ﬁrms. Environmentalists gain broader adherence to norms that they support—many
of which have an inherently global character. At the same time,
EU corporations gain a level playing ﬁeld whereby foreign ﬁrms
do not gain a competitive advantage at their expense (DeSombre,
2000). Thus, the EU has a particularly powerful incentive to act
externally when the moral and economic imperatives of the community coincide—when it enjoys political rents from EU industry
and the consumer and environmental advocates at the same time
(Vogel, 1995).
The EU’s external regulatory power further serves the bureaucratic interests of the European Commission. Through extensive
use of its regulatory powers, the Commission compensates for the
lack of power it otherwise has in external affairs. The Commission’s
legal competence to act on its Member States’ behalf in foreign policy or security-related matters is limited and subject to unanimity
among the Member States. On issues relating to the single market,
the EU’s legal authority is at its broadest. Exercising the regulatory
authority also involves low costs. Regulations are not constrained
by budgetary appropriations and are hence not dependent on the
tax revenues available to the Community institutions. Given that
the EU’s budget amounts to only around 1% of the GDP of the EU,
the Commission has limited options to pursue policies that involve
direct budgetary expenditures. Thus, the only way for the Commission to exert inﬂuence without extensive ﬁnancial resources is to
engage in regulatory activity. The cost of implementing and enforcing regulations often fall on the governments of the individual
member states while the cost of complying with these regulations
is primarily borne by ﬁrms and individuals as targets of the EU regulations. In the absence of traditional powers of states to tax and

spend (not to mention wage a war), it may not therefore be surprising that the Commission has built an empire of laws and regulations
(Majone, 1994).
Yet perhaps the most compelling narrative views the EU’s external inﬂuence simply as an accidental byproduct of its internal
motivations. The supranational regulatory apparatus was created
to establish and oversee an integrated, liberalized, and competitive market in Europe. This institutional capacity was a response to
internal challenges driven by a political agenda that was inwardlooking. Inconsistent domestic regulations were seen to threaten
the single market, prompting the need for harmonization. The
importance of preserving the single market has also driven various regulations that do not directly serve the goals of economic
integration. For instance, the EU’s expanded regulatory authority
in consumer and environmental matters was created to reassure
the European public that economic integration would not be pursued at the expense of consumer and environmental protection.
Rather than aiming to provide global environmental standards, the
EU was thus concerned with the legitimacy of the single market
program (Vogel, 2012). Acknowledging the primacy of these internal motivations also suggests that the EU’s external inﬂuence is not
compromised during times when it is turned inwards—the external
power ﬂows directly from the EU’s pursuit of its internal goals.
While the primary objective of European regulatory activity has
been to create and guard the single market, this activity has had the
ancillary effect of establishing the EU as a global regulatory hegemon. This external dimension of the single market was only fully
realized when the EU’s trading partners expressed concerns that
the single market might impose costs on third countries (Gstohl,
2007). Of course, the EU—in particular its institutions representing the Community interest on the world stage—beneﬁts from
such “incidental externalities” that follow from the EU’s pursuit
of the Community’s internal regulatory agenda. These actors likely
welcome the EU’s newfound external regulatory power, however
unintended its origin.
Indeed, some may argue that it is impossible today to disentangle the relative importance of internal and external motivations as
drivers of the EU’s regulatory agenda. But what is distinctive to the
Brussels Effect is that it describes the external impact of regulations
that the EU would have enacted anyway in order to accomplish
the internal objectives related to the single market. Of course,
the awareness of the external impact of its regulations—once
established— can lead the EU to use the Brussels Effect as an argument to convince any reluctant interest groups within the EU to
go along with its regulatory agenda. Being able to show that the
EU companies’ international competitiveness is not compromised
when undertaking new regulatory burdens shows how the Brussels
Effect can be linked to the EU’s internal objectives.
Over time, it is plausible that the EU’s internal goals are gradually
giving way to a more multi-faceted set of goals—both internal and
external—that the EU pursues in setting its regulatory policy today.
Still, it is the internal goals relating to the need to harmonize regulations within the EU that provide the most powerful explanation
for the origins of, and the motivations for, the Brussels Effect.
3.3. Market-driven versus political harmonization
The EU is not always passive or unintentional in its exercise
of global regulatory power. Similarly, the Brussels Effect is not
the sole manifestation of the EU’s global regulatory inﬂuence. At
times, EU rules diffuse through voluntary legislative borrowing
by other states or through various benchmarking mechanisms
(Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008; Linos, 2011). These methods may require
little involvement by any EU institutions. The EU also actively
exports its standards through bilateral agreements—most glaringly,
though accession agreements and partnership treaties—or, in more
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extreme instance, relies on economic sanctions or other forms of
coercion to pursue its policy goals (Smith, 2003; Hufbauer et al.,
2009; Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2006).19
These other methods of externalizing EU standards have been
discussed elsewhere and will not be reviewed here. Instead, the
below discussion focuses on explaining why the logic underlying
the Brussels Effect often represents a more attractive means for
the EU to externalize its standards on foreign actors when compared to accomplishing the same via political harmonization. At
the same time, it also explains why and when—these advantages
of the Brussels Effect notwithstanding—the EU continues to engage
in regulatory harmonization via its political agency as well.
Market-driven harmonization has a distinct advantage over
political harmonization: it entails low contracting costs and limited
enforcement costs. In relying on unilateral measures, the EU is not
forced to seek the consent of other states. Unilateralism avoids the
need to overcome collective action problems. It also obviates the
need to extend costly transfer payments or to undertake costly
coercive measures toward countries reluctant to join a treaty or an
institution. The EU can also forgo the uncertainties associated with
the ratiﬁcation of treaties by foreign legislators. The EU’s recent
unsuccessful efforts to further the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations
and the UN-led process to negotiate a new global climate change
treaty reveal the difﬁculties associated with multilateral cooperation. These processes have required extensive political capital and
diplomatic efforts and yielded few results. Instead of engaging in
burdensome diplomacy to endorse its standards, market-driven
harmonization allows the EU to outsource the lobbying to foreign
ﬁrms who often become advocates for higher standards in their
own home markets after having incurred compliance costs in the
EU.
The EU’s unilateral regulatory agenda is more easily implemented as it requires the cooperation of foreign corporations
willing to trade in its market rather than cooperation by foreign
sovereigns. A contrast can be drawn to the efforts of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. State Department to
enforce U.S. rules on insider trading. These efforts were complicated
by the reluctance of foreign countries, particularly Switzerland, to
cooperate with the United States due to their domestic laws on
bank secrecy. The United States has had to spend extensive political capital to persuade Swiss authorities to cooperate. This was
considered worth the effort given that Swiss banks hold approximately half of the world’s private assets (Macey, 2003). The United
States’ ability to curtail domestic insider trading would have been
compromised had it not secured a change in the domestic rules of
a foreign country. Merely incentivizing foreign corporations operating in the United States to cooperate was not sufﬁcient to meet
this goal.
Political harmonization is particularly difﬁcult if states do not
agree on the beneﬁts of global standards. But multilateral standardsetting is difﬁcult even if most states agree on the desirability of
uniform standards. States often have different views on the optimal standard to which they should converge. Different points of
convergence entail different distributional consequences, making
some states prefer one standard over another (Bradford, 2007). Unilateral regulatory globalization solves such coordination problems:
the most stringent rule becomes the focal point of convergence. A
mutual understanding that the EU can retain its standards at no
cost provides a predictable and stable equilibrium.
Perhaps most importantly, market-driven harmonization provides the most efﬁcient form of regulatory globalization because
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See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern
and Southern Neighbours, at 5, COM (2003) 104 ﬁnal (Mar. 11, 2003).
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the EU can rely on its existing domestic institutions to enforce
its regulations. Treaties are distinctly difﬁcult and expensive to
enforce. When a strict global standard is a product of an international treaty, there is no guarantee that the treaty will be
implemented and enforced. Indeed, some commentators have
noted that treaties producing “effectively enforced international
standards are the exception rather than the rule” (Vogel and Kagan,
2004).
The EU has not abandoned multilateralism in favor of unilateralism in all instances. The EU also maintains an active political agenda
that is geared at international regulatory harmonization. The EU’s
persisting, if selective, reliance on multilateral rules and political
institutions may be surprising given the many beneﬁts embedded
in unilateral globalization. Yet there are certain instances where
market-driven harmonization is not enough, prompting the EU
to seek afﬁrmative adoption of regulation by foreign regulators.
When above-discussed conditions for unilateral harmonization are
not present, no Brussels Effect takes place—whether de jure or de
facto. In these situations, multilateralism is often the only path to
regulatory globalization.
The theory underlying the Brussels Effect offers predictions on
when the EU is likely to pursue political harmonization. The EU
would be expected to seek political harmonization in situations
where it cares about international standards and where the Brussels Effect fails to reach EU corporations’ important export markets.
In the absence of a level playing ﬁeld, the EU’s export-oriented ﬁrms
may have difﬁculties penetrating these markets. Thus, when the EU
is a net exporter as opposed to a net importer of a certain product,
the EU is expected to care more about the standard of the export
market than that of its home market. Further, it is precisely then
that the Brussels Effect is least likely to automatically ratchet the
standard up, since net importer countries have a smaller presence
in the EU. The EU is therefore likely to expend diplomatic efforts to
negotiate multilateral standards in areas where it is a net exporter
and rely on markets in areas where it is a net importer.
The EU may also be motivated to encourage third countries to
adopt certain standards if its internal regulatory objectives would
be compromised by more lenient standards elsewhere. This is true
when actions of other countries produce negative externalities that
adversely impact Europe, such as when China’s failure to limit its
greenhouse gas emissions directly compromises the EU’s efforts to
halt climate change. Another example would be the EU’s efforts
to convince other countries to adopt tough domestic competition
laws (Bradford, 2007). The deterrent effect of the EU’s competition
laws can be compromised if members of a cartel are able to offset
high EU ﬁnes by reaping supracompetitive proﬁts in markets that
fail to control their collusive practices.20 Foreign standards may
also reinforce the desired effect of EU standards. For example, when
standards are characterized by network effects, the beneﬁts relative
to the costs of adopting a standard increase when several countries
have the same standard (Vogel and Kagan, 2004).
The EU may also seek to encourage third countries to adopt its
standards in cases where it is acting out of a moral imperative. If the
EU is motivated by a moral quest to change behavior globally—e.g.,
promote human rights—unilateral globalization is rarely sufﬁcient.
This is particularly likely when the issue is salient to inﬂuential
domestic political groups that seek to export an ideology or moral
convictions and when they care about establishing standards for
universal conduct (Macey, 2003).
Finally, at times the EU may pursue political harmonization
even when market-driven harmonization is taking place. This
may reﬂect willingness to “lock-in” certain EU standards by
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See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004).
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institutionalizing them.21 This can be a shrewd way to preempt a
future state of the world where market access will be a less effective
tool for the EU to exert inﬂuence. The EU is also often successful in
incorporating its standards into international organizations, making the beneﬁts of unilateralism over multilateralism less stark.
Being a construction of intergovernmental cooperation itself, the
EU has extensive experience in promulgating rules that lend themselves to adoption by heterogeneous states. The EU is also skillful
in using its institutional structure—being a hybrid between state
and a federation—to its advantage. In international negotiations,
it can leverage the negotiating power of twenty-eight countries
while also using the same number strategically as a constraint
when portraying itself as an agent whose hands are tied and who
can therefore only sign onto a set of policies that pass the various
domestic veto points (Safrin, 2008).
Market-driven and political harmonization can also take place
in sequence. The EU is better able to institutionalize its standard if
a limited Brussels Effect has already taken place: a set of countries
exporting into the EU already follow the EU standard, whether de
jure or de facto. The EU may seek to reinforce this trend by requiring
its standards to be adopted as a condition for closer economic and
political relationships with the EU, increasing its sphere of inﬂuence within its neighborhood. These developments allow the EU
to reach a critical mass that tips the balance in Europe’s favor in
any international efforts to reach an agreement on harmonization
of certain regulations (Bradford, 2007).
4. The motivations for adopting global standards
This Section explains why foreign corporations have adopted EU
regulations even when they would have preferred an alternative
rule. It also explains why foreign governments have been unable to
constrain the EU’s regulatory agenda or interfere with the markets’
ability to entrench EU norms across jurisdictions.
4.1. The reluctant emulation of EU standards
In many instances, the EU policies impose adjustment costs on
foreign corporations. Foreign consumers also often end up paying
more for goods when producers are forced to accommodate concerns that their domestic consumers do not necessarily share. For
this reason, most foreign corporations, supported by their governments, vehemently oppose EU regulations. The European chemical
regulation, the “REACH,” is an example. As the regulation applies
to approximately 30,000 chemicals, its impact on the $600 billion
U.S. chemical industry is profound (Kogan, 2005; Shapiro, 2004).
The critics claim that REACH imposes signiﬁcant costs and challenges on manufacturers and importers, particularly related to the
supply chain, sales, and procurement. At worst, the regulation is
said to impede innovation and the development of new substances
due to fears that they would not meet the more stringent European
requirements (Pouillot et al., 2009).
Notwithstanding their resistance of EU rules, foreign corporations often adopt the EU norms as the “golden standard” that
governs their global operations. As long as corporations’ conduct
or production is non-divisible across markets, these corporations
are driven to conform their conduct or production to a single global
rule. Their choice as to which standard to adopt is determined
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the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: A Single Market for Citizens, COM (2007) 60 ﬁnal
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by the relative stringency of the standards across relevant regulators. By choosing to adjust its business practices to the most
demanding standard—typically the EU standard—a corporation can
typically ensure its compliance with all regulations that it confronts when operating in multiple jurisdictions. Of course, if the
adjustment costs exceed the beneﬁts of operating on that market,
the corporation likely forgoes access to that market. However, the
adjustment is likely whenever the market in question is an important source of consumer demand. In particular, this is the case when
the demand in the corporation’s home market or in alternative third
markets is inadequate and the opportunities for diverting trade to
those markets is therefore limited. This way, while this corporation
would have initially preferred another rule, the logic of participating in international economic activity—not any coercive measures
imposed by the EU—steers the corporation toward EU standards.
This distinct nature of the Brussels Effect—a phenomenon falling
somewhere between cooperation and coercion—distinguishes it
from conventional theories on regulatory globalization. At times,
countries with lenient regulatory standards have an incentive to
adopt other countries’ stricter standards in order to attract foreign
capital (Simmons, 2004). This was the case with, for instance, the
U.S. capital adequacy requirements and accounting standards for
public offerings. This type of voluntary emulation of strict standards
amounts to a market-driven race to the top that is normatively
desirable—the followers have a clear economic incentive to adopt
the desirable rules that leave everyone better off. In contrast, unilateral regulatory globalization is rarely a process of voluntary
harmonization: foreign corporations would often prefer another
rule but ﬁnd it rational to adjust nonetheless given the opportunity costs of not doing so. Yet the EU is not coercing others to
adopt its rules either. Market forces are sufﬁcient to create “involuntary incentives” to adjust to the rules of the strict regulator. In
other words, unilateral regulatory globalization entails the dominant jurisdiction imposing an incentive to adjust, followed by
reluctant emulation by market participants.
However, some foreign stakeholders may welcome the EU’s
extensive regulatory activity. U.S. consumers who prefer higher
levels of consumer protection and a civil society that advocates
environmental protection often seize EU policies and use them in
their attempts to forge change in the U.S. (Young, 2003; Scott, 2009).
These groups welcome the EU’s unilateralism, hailing the EU as the
benevolent provider of global public goods in situations where their
own governments or multilateral cooperation mechanisms fail to
provide them.
Multinational U.S. corporations may have also a mixed reaction
to EU regulation. When trading across the common market, they
beneﬁt from facing a single EU standard instead of 28 different
national standards, even if that standard was higher than the average standard before the upward harmonization took place in the EU.
This way, EU regulations can be seen as coordination devices that
reduce complexity and enhance predictability. U.S. corporations
can also seize business opportunities in third markets in situations
where the EU bans certain products or production methods domestically but where there is still demand for those products in third
markets. In these markets where the Brussels Effect has failed to
take hold, U.S. producers are likely to face less competition from
EU producers.
The intensity of U.S. corporations’ opposition to EU rules also
likely depends on whether they are large, export-oriented producers or small, non-export-oriented producers (Milner, 1998). If an
export-oriented U.S. ﬁrm is forced to adjust its global production
to the (presumably more costly) EU-standard, the non-exportoriented U.S. ﬁrm gains a competitive advantage in the ﬁrms’ home
market (the only market in which the non-exporting ﬁrm operates).
The small non-exporting ﬁrm thus welcomes the de facto Brussels
Effect. However, these ﬁrms’ interests are reversed with respect to
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a possible de jure Brussels Effect. An export-oriented U.S. ﬁrm often
has the incentive to advocate the EU standard in its home market
after having already adjusted to the EU-standard. It beneﬁts from
leveling the playing ﬁeld at its home market at no additional cost to
itself. In contrast, a non-export-oriented U.S. ﬁrm is likely to resist
the de jure Brussels Effect as it beneﬁts from retaining its competitive advantage over the ﬁrm conforming to the EU standard. Thus,
the relative inﬂuence of export-oriented and non-export oriented
ﬁrms will impact the U.S.’s response to the Brussels Effect.
Finally, the EU provides a forum for U.S. producers to challenge their competitors’ practices under EU competition rules. For
example, U.S. corporations have found the EU a valuable legal battle ground and frequently engage in forum shopping when they
seek to halt practices of their (often domestic) competitors. U.S.based United Technologies was the principal complainant in the
GE/Honeywell merger investigation after having lost its acquisition
bid to GE. It was also a U.S. company that brought charges against
Microsoft in the EU, knowing that it was more likely to obtain remedies in the EU, which harbors a broader notion of what constitutes
anti-competitive conduct. As the tables turned, Microsoft lodged
a competition complaint before the European Commission against
Google.
Whether these foreign stakeholders embrace or oppose the
Brussels Effect, they have the incentive to invest considerable
resources in trying to inﬂuence regulatory outcomes in the EU.
Indeed, given the global reach of the EU’s regulatory actions, lobbying activity is particularly salient in Brussels as the beneﬁts
available from the possible regulatory capture of the Commission
or another EU institution is expected to exceed the beneﬁts of successfully inﬂuencing any other regulatory agency with lesser global
clout.

4.2. The difﬁculty of counterbalancing the EU
Some progressive states in the U.S., most notably California, have
occasionally endorsed the EU’s leadership. The EU’s chemical regulation is an example of California’s willingness to follow the EU’s
regulatory lead (Scott, 2009; Pohl, 2004). For these states, the EU
can be a catalyst and a resource that helps them in their pursuit
of domestic regulatory reforms. Some developing country governments similarly welcome the Brussels Effect. If these countries
have the desire, but limited resources, to provide safer products for their consumers, they beneﬁt from the EU standards that
affect production patterns globally. The Brussels Effect presents
these countries with an opportunity to outsource their regulatory
pursuits to a more resourceful agency. For example, developing
country competition agencies often free-ride on the EU’s competition investigations, beneﬁting from the global effects of the EU’s
decision to ban anti-competitive mergers or force ﬁrms to amend
their conduct and products globally.
Even if there are occasional foreign beneﬁciaries from EU regulations, most foreign governments are reluctant to cede their power
to regulate the behavior of their corporations to a foreign regulator.
These governments, including the U.S., have an incentive to constrain the EU. The U.S. frequently views the EU’s regulatory policies
as inefﬁcient and detrimental to its welfare—in addition to being
counter-majoritarian and thus undemocratic. If we assume that the
existing domestic regulation in the U.S. is efﬁcient in the sense that
it maximizes national welfare and reﬂects domestic political equilibrium, any deviation from that standard entails costs. Firms need
to reorganize their production processes or practices in order to
comply with another standard (Drezner, 2005). Governments incur
costs relating to legislating and retraining its regulators (Drezner,
2005). And, most importantly, the U.S. must forgo the efﬁciencies
that its preferred regulation would generate.
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The U.S. government has often voiced its opposition to the external effect of the EU’s regulatory agenda. For example, prompted
by the American chemicals industry, the U.S. government engaged
in extensive efforts to block the EU’s regulation of chemicals.22
U.S. reaction to the EU’s interventionist competition laws has been
equally hostile (Murray et al., 2001). And the recent plan to subject
foreign airlines to the EU’s ETS system has been fervidly opposed
by U.S. airlines and the U.S. government, as well as other foreign
governments (Murray et al., 2001; Chafﬁn and Parker, 2011).
Yet there is very little that the U.S. can do to stop the EU from
regulating its domestic market. In this sense, the Brussels Effect
differs starkly from the California Effect. California cannot promulgate regulations that are inconsistent with the federal laws in the
U.S. absent an explicit waiver from the U.S. federal government. But
there is nothing akin to a doctrine of pre-emption that constrains
the EU’s regulatory powers.23 When U.S. producers are forced to
either comply with higher standards or be shut out of the EU market, the U.S. has four ways to respond: (1) choose voluntarily to
converge to the EU standard; (2) try to compel the EU to change
its rules, such as by resorting to diplomacy, suing the EU in the
WTO, or offering the EU some rewards or threatening the EU with
sanctions; (3) seek a cooperative solution, such as by pursuing an
international standard that reﬂects some combination of US and EU
preferences; or, ﬁnally, (4) choose to do nothing.
A challenge for the U.S. is that it often gains nothing by defending its standard even if that standard was more efﬁcient. As a less
stringent regulator, the U.S. simply becomes obsolete in the ﬁelds
where the de facto Brussels Effect takes place. But the U.S. is unlikely
to adopt the EU standard as a regular course of action, either. When
holding onto its own domestic standards, the U.S. can at least ensure
that its standard governs the activity that is domestic in nature. And
given how large the U.S. market is, this often provides an adequate
incentive to stick to its preferred regulation domestically absent
overwhelming lobbying by domestic export-oriented industries to
the contrary.
The most controversial strategy for the U.S. or any other foreign government would be to threaten the EU with sanctions. The
EU’s decision to include foreign airlines into its ETS scheme, for
example, has provoked threats that foreign carriers may forgo European Airbus planes in favor of competing US-based Boeing planes
(Michaels, 2012; Chafﬁn, 2012). However, the prospect of a trade
war is often too costly for the countries themselves to pursue as
a strategy. In many instances, the proposed trade sanctions would
also be inconsistent with the countries’ obligations under the WTO.
In past U.S.-EU competition enforcement conﬂicts, for instance, the
U.S. threatened the EU with trade sanctions unless the EU backed
down (Coleman, 1997). Yet notwithstanding the escalated rhetoric
of retaliation, the competition controversies led the U.S. government to concede that “we have no power to change EU law.”24
At times, international institutions have provided the most
effective venue to challenge the EU regulations. The WTO law prevents countries from restricting imports from countries with less
stringent regulations unless the restriction is necessary to protect
public health or related to conservation of the environment. The
U.S. did resort to the WTO in challenging the EU’s prohibition on
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GMO food and hormone-treated beef, eventually winning its core
claims in both trade disputes.25 Despite these victories, the WTO
offers, at best, imperfect remedies. The WTO dispute settlement
mechanism is characterized by weaknesses such as non-retroactive
sanctions. In addition, the WTO system cannot compel a member
state to lift its restrictive measures. It can merely authorize sanctions against a non-compliant member state. For instance, the EU
has maintained its import-ban on hormone-treated beef, preferring
to endure U.S. retaliation. The EU has also repeatedly allowed the
deadline for implementing the GMO-ruling to lapse, while the U.S.
has suspended its retaliatory measures in anticipation of settlement
or the EU’s future compliance (Hanrahan, 2010). These difﬁculties
the U.S. has faced in obtaining EU’s compliance suggests that the
WTO provides even less relief for the EU’s weaker trading partners. Authorizing a small developing country to punish its powerful
trading partner hardly guarantees that this right will be used.
The WTO’s ability to constrain individual countries’ regulations
is further limited by its restricted mandate. The WTO bans discrimination between importers and domestic producers. Yet many
of the EU regulations, while perhaps costly to foreign producers,
are not discriminatory in their nature: EU companies are subject
to the same rules. If the EU regulations have no disparate impact
on foreign producers, allegations of protectionism are difﬁcult to
maintain. The WTO can do little to restrain such regulations that
are costly yet not protectionist in their object or effect. Further,
many areas—such as competition and privacy regulations—do not
fall within the purview of the WTO rules and its dispute settlement
mechanism in the ﬁrst place. There have been several attempts
to include competition, among other new issue areas, under the
WTO framework. All those attempts have failed (Bradford, 2011).
And expanding the scope of the WTO to new issue areas is even
more unlikely today as the consensus among over 150 countries
that rarely agree on the content of the rules is increasingly beyond
reach.
Indeed, the WTO does not only fail to adequately constrain the
Brussels Effect; at times it may even help to facilitate it. The WTO
rules limit the ability of the EU’s trading partners to respond to
EU regulatory pursuits with unilateral retaliation. Had the U.S., for
instance, imposed trade sanctions on the EU when faced with the
EU’s data transfer ban, it would have violated the WTO rules and
subjected itself to a WTO complaint by the EU. In this sense, the
WTO can also provide a shield for, and not only a limitation to, the
Brussels Effect (Schaffer, 2000).
5. Conclusion
This Article has highlighted the unprecedented global power
that the EU exercises through its legal institutions and standards
that it successfully exports to the rest of the world via the Brussels
Effect. Without resorting to international institutions or seeking
other nations’ cooperation, the EU is able to promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the legal frameworks of developed
and developing markets alike, leading to the “Europeanization” of
important aspects of global commerce.
The occurrence of the Brussels Effect depends on the presence of
speciﬁc conditions that allow the EU to forgo political harmonization and let the markets convert its regional standards into global
standards. This Article has sought to identify those conditions and,
with an enhanced understanding of those conditions, explain why

25
See Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135;
Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and
Corr.1, adopted 21 November 2006, DSR 2006:III-VIII, 847.

some regulations, but not others, can be externalized via market forces alone. It has disputed the notion that the market size
alone is conducive to gravitating companies toward the dominant
jurisdiction’s standards. Instead, a single jurisdiction can passively
export its standards only when it also has the regulatory capacity
and regulatory propensity to regulate inelastic targets with strict and
non-divisible standards. This explains why the EU is currently the
only regulatory regime that can wield unilateral inﬂuence across a
number of areas of law and why other large economies, including
the US and China, lack this kind of power.
This discussion has been descriptive, intentionally omitting
the normative inquiry on whether the Brussels Effect is socially
desirable. It seems evident that corporations are not necessarily adjusting to EU standards because of the prospect of mutual
gains or some Pareto-improving outcome. If existing regulations in
other jurisdictions are optimal, the Brussels Effect is likely to lead
to inefﬁciently high overall global regulation, adversely affecting
global welfare. But the Brussels Effects may also lead to an efﬁcient outcome. If existing regulations in other jurisdictions are too
permissive or weakly enforced, unilateral regulatory globalization
might be a desirable means of overriding sub-optimally low regulations elsewhere. The overall welfare effects of this phenomenon
are thus difﬁcult to disentangle.
For some, the Brussels Effect may also raise concerns of
democratic accountability. The idea that unelected European civil
servants have the ability to determine what kind of products are
produced for the U.S. markets and thus how much protection American consumers thus need can be disconcerting to those involved.
However, others might claim that the Brussels Effect does not
undermine U.S. democracy. The EU’s regulatory reach may have the
effect of balancing the overrepresentation of business interests in
American public life by empowering consumers (Keohane, 2009).
These are some of the normative questions that this Article raises
but intentionally leaves for others.
The acknowledgment of the existence and inﬂuence of the Brussels Effect has implications on how we think about power and the
question of who is powerful and why. If you were to ask national
security experts whether the EU is powerful, they would probably
say no. If you were to ask economist whether the EU is powerful, they would probably discuss how the relative power of the EU
is diminishing with the rise of China. But if you were to ask GE,
Microsoft, Google, Monsanto, Dow Chemical, or Revlon whether
the EU is powerful, the answer would be a resounding (and likely
bitter) yes.
One key question is what type of power matters today. Much
of international relations discussion has until the recent past been
preoccupied by the traditional notion of military power. Yet the
utility of military power is declining (Gelb, 2010). Economic concerns usually prevail over military imperatives. In the world of
multiple powers and heterogeneous interests, exercise of unilateral economic power is rarely possible. The inability to conclude the
WTO trade talks is one reminder that in the world where many are
powerful, nobody alone is powerful enough to get anything done.
Economic sanctions are rarely successful today because embargoed
nations have an easier time ﬁnding alternative suppliers or markets
for their products. Conditional aid and other rewards, traditionally
used by powerful nations and institutions like the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund as means of leverage, are decreasingly
effective as countries like China are prepared to extend aid to rogue
and needy countries—no strings attached.
When power is deﬁned in terms of the actual inﬂuence that a
country can wield, the EU’s ability to penetrate vast areas of global
commerce is relevant. Contrary to traditional contours of inﬂuence,
the Brussels Effect captures a phenomenon where the EU does not
have to do anything except regulate its own market to exercise
global regulatory power. The size and attractiveness of its market
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does the rest. By virtue of being the world’s largest trading block,
the EU can dictate what is traded. It is one of the few areas of inﬂuence where unilateralism still works. Regulatory power is a less
costly, more deployable, and more durable type of power. Also,
unlike other forms of power, it cannot easily be undermined by
others.
Another advantage of regulatory power is its ability to generate
leverage that has the greatest impact with the lowest political proﬁle. Many of the regulations appear technical but often have major
implications on countries, corporations, and consumers around the
world. Conﬂicts over regulatory power rarely elevate to the political level. Trade is a much less controversial way of pursuing foreign
policy objectives in particular when the EU can always, in principle, offer the choice of not complying with its rules. Subscribing
to EU rules is the price of trading with Europe. All the EU is doing
is exercising its right to protect its own consumers. This is a less
controversial position to take compared to a regime change pursued in the name of laudable goals such as democracy or human
rights. Thus, in falling between coercion and cooperation, regulatory power strikes a balance of legitimacy and potency that makes
it a more efﬁcacious option than its alternatives.
The EU’s regulatory clout shows that the EU can be a superpower without a super state. It is a shrewd and inﬂuential actor that
projects its values and makes the world to its liking by playing to its
strengths. While the EU portrays itself as a champion of multilateralism, it is selectively supporting multilateralism in areas where
it lacks unilateral power. The more the EU bolsters the authority of
the UN Security Council, the more the EU can constrain the exercise
of unilateral power by the U.S. But when it comes to the regulation
of global markets, the EU can rely on its markets and hence be less
concerned about pursuing multilateral, institutional cooperation.
The somewhat surprising outcome is that the EU’s increasing
regulatory clout and its impact on U.S. businesses may lead the U.S.
to support greater oversight by international institutions. Though
often skeptical of international institutions’ ability to regulate the
markets, the U.S. may come to see international cooperation as
an opportunity to play a shared, rather than obsolete, role in the
regulation of global commerce. This might resemble the idea of
“pre-emptive federalism,” whereby the U.S. may seek international
regulation as a means to prevent the Brussels Effect. Having some
inﬂuence over regulatory standards is better than ceding inﬂuence to the EU altogether. The impending negotiations to create
a Transatlantic free trade area26 form this type of rare opportunity
for the US to try to persuade the EU to rein in its regulatory standards. Given the low level of existing transatlantic tariff barriers,
the gains from the prospective free trade agreement are expected
to stem from the parties’ ability to overcome their existing regulatory differences. But this, of course, requires that the EU be prepared
to forgo unilateralism for jointly set standards, enhancing EU’s bargaining power in the negotiations.
Another implication of the Brussels Effect is that it challenges the
primacy of the narrative that the EU is a “normative power” that
leads by example. The EU is often viewed as a power that relies on
persuasion to change “hearts and minds” and thereby the preferences and identities of other actors. The EU is regularly portrayed
as a new type of power that steers away from coercion and relies
instead on positive incentives and soft power.27 This Article has
not argued that those propensities of inﬂuence are not within the
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EU’s repertoire of inﬂuence. Yet this Article has focused on what is
a vast, unappreciated, and perhaps the most controversial aspect
of the EU’s global role: the EU’s unilateral employment of tools of
soft coercion that go against the preferences of its trading partners.
Another question is how long lasting this type of unilateral regulatory globalization is. With advances in technology, it is possible
that goods become increasingly divisible in the future.28 It is likely
to become technologically feasible and economically viable to produce a greater range of product varieties to serve the different
consumer tastes and regulatory requirements prevailing in different markets. The acknowledgment of the Brussels Effect should
further incentivize companies to develop technologies that allow
for greater divisibility at lower costs. Such a development, to the
extent that it applies to a signiﬁcant number of product markets,
may gradually erode the EU’s ability to exert global regulatory clout
in the future.
Also the EU’s ability to promulgate new rules may diminish
over time. As the EU’s regulatory powers grow, divisions within
the EU also grow. It becomes harder for the EU to pass new regulations amidst the growing heterogeneity of its population. One
salient example is that the EU has been unable to create a common
energy policy despite the EU member states’ collective vulnerability to energy insecurity (Laïdi, 2007). Enlargement magniﬁes this
problem as preferences within the EU become more diverse while
the EU institutions fail to adjust to more complex decision-making.
Today, the EU faces a distinctive challenge to its authority. The
concurrent deepening and widening of the EU’s agenda has already
created severe constitutional crises within the EU, with the difﬁculties surrounding the euro further testing the limits of solidarity
within the union. The EU is criticized both for mandating painful
austerity on debtor countries and imposing forced solidarity on
creditor countries. As a result, both sets of countries feel alienated from the EU. The great political divide in Europe today is not
between the right and the left but between those who are turned
inwards and those who embrace globalization and further integration. The former would scale back the powers transferred to
the EU in the name of reinstating the sovereignty of European
nations. Fearful of these demands, even the integrationists are
growing more timid in their calls for expanding EU powers at the
expense of national sovereignty. More European regulation means
less sovereignty. And less sovereignty means more unpredictability and loss of control akin to the crises surrounding the common
European currency. Thus, the growing gap between these different
visions within Europe for Europe, in the end, presents perhaps the
greatest challenge to the European external regulatory agenda.
To add to the internal political challenges, the economic and
geo-political reality outside Europe is changing. Over time, the
EU’s regulatory clout may begin to erode as the emerging markets
increase in the size and afﬂuence of their consumer base. Today,
corporations are rarely able to carve out the EU as a market for their
products and services and divert trade elsewhere. But as demand in
places like China grows, the businesses’ dependence on their access
to the EU market is diminishing. It is difﬁcult to imagine a future
state of the world where genuinely multinational companies like
GE would choose to forgo trade in Europe and thus avoid clearing
its transactions and conduct with EU’s competition authorities. But
the opportunities for trading elsewhere will increase, reducing the
opportunity costs of forgoing the European market at least with
respect to some products and activities. China will increasingly be
in a position to offer an alternative destination for various goods if
European standards make it too costly for businesses to trade there.
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Still, the growing might of Chinese consumers is an imperfect
threat, at best, to the near term ability of the EU to continue on its
chosen path. It will be a while before China could replace the EU
as a source of de facto global standards. China’s regulatory capacity and the willingness to elevate the protection of consumers and
the environment over the pursuit of growth are not growing with
the speed of its economy. While China has banned a few high proﬁle global mergers (Zhang and Yanhua Zhang, 2010),29 it has by
no means overtaken the European Commission as the most ardent
guardian of competitive markets. And while China may soon be the
largest consumer market, GDP per capita is a better prediction of
a country’s regulatory propensity than is overall GDP (Vogel and
Kagan, 2004). Afﬂuence and social regulation are often correlated,
suggesting that domestic demand for high levels of regulation is
likely to be weak for some time to come. By the time China might
be able to overtake the EU as a de facto global regulator, the EU
might already have entrenched its norms in other jurisdictions and
institutions and changed the way business is conducted in a lasting
way.
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